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Abstract
The dominance of income over commodity taxation for the single con-
sumer case, implies that if the consumer is asked about what tax she
would pay to bear a given tax burden, she would choose income taxation.
This paper provides a version of this preference for income taxation for
the case of several heterogeneous consumers by means of a game where the
government allows each consumer to choose between the two tax regimes.
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E. Moreno and F. Santos-Arteaga, and the participans at the XXX Simposio de Análisis
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1 Introduction
The comparison between income (direct) and commodity (indirect) taxation is
one of the oldest issues in Public Economics since Barone (1912) showed that,
keeping constant the utility of the taxpayer, the Exchequer could obtain a larger
revenue from an income tax as opposed to a commodity tax. Diﬀerent versions
of this income taxation dominance, such as Borgatta (1921), Joseph (1939),
Hicks (1939), and Peacock and Berry (1951) among others, were subsequently
published. Nowadays this dominance is taught in several microeconomics text-
books. In particular, Stigler (1987) and Varian (1992) show the version provided
by Borgatta (1921) and Joseph (1939) for the single consumer and two goods
case. In such a case the proposition asserts that a given tax revenue yield would
leave the taxpayer better oﬀ under an income tax than under a commodity tax.
The proof of this proposition is based on the fact that both taxes have to collect
the same tax revenue k. Let us illustrate this proof by considering a single con-
sumer with regular preferences on the amounts x, y of two commodities. Since
(p+ t)x+qy = w and px+qy = (1−T )w are the consumer’s budget lines under
commodity and income taxation respectively, the bundle chosen under com-
modity taxation x(t), y(t) is aﬀordable under income taxation as well, because
commodity tax revenue equals income tax revenue, i. e. tx(t) = Tw = k.
y 
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px+qy = (1-T)w 
x(t) 
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Figure 1
As can be seen in figure 1, a consequence of this feature is that the bundle
chosen under commodity taxation x(T ), y(T ) is directly revealed preferred to
the bundle x(t), y(t), that is, the weak axiom of revealed preference holds. This
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allows us to assert that, if the consumer is asked about what tax she would pay
to bear a given tax burden, she would choose income taxation, that is, income
taxation is preferred to commodity taxation.
This paper extends a version of this preference for income taxation for the
case of several heterogeneous individuals. The model conceives of two goods,
a fixed quantity k of numerarie which has to be taken by the government and
n diﬀerent heterogeneous consumers. This version of the preference for income
taxation is a game where the government allows each consumer to choose be-
tween two tax regimes: a commodity taxation or an income taxation. In the case
where the consumer chooses the income taxation, and parallel to what happens
in the single consumer case, she has to bear a constant tax rate on her income
given by the ratio between k and the total income of the economy; if she decides
on the commodity taxation, she has to bear an excise tax added to the price of
one of the goods. The tax revenue is the sum of both commodity and income
taxation and the government keeps budgetary equilibrium all time. While the
income tax rate is constant, the commodity tax depends on the number of con-
sumers who are bearing it. As a result of that, strategic interdependence arises
from the number of consumers who are paying the commodity tax. As we will
see, in the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game everyone ends
up choosing the income taxation regime.
2 The Model
Let I = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of heterogeneous consumers, denoted by i ∈
I, whose diﬀerent preferences respect to the consumption of the goods X,Y
are represented by a well-behaved utility function ui(xi, yi). Each consumer is
endowed with a quantity wi of observable income, let W =
P
I wi the total
income. An amount 0 < k < W of income has to be collected by a government;
and (p, q) are the prices of goods X,Y, respectively.
For collecting the quantity k the government gives two options to consumers.
On the one hand an excise tax t ≥ 0 on the consumption of good X. In this
case the i-th consumer budget constraint is
Bi(t) =
©
(xi, yi) ∈ R2+ : wi ≥ (p+ t)xi + qyi
ª
. (1)
Let (xi(t), yi(t)) be the bundle that maximizes ui(xi, yi) subject to Bi(t), and
vi(t) = ui (xi(t), yi(t)) her utility after the optimal decision.
On the other hand, the consumer can choose bearing a proportional tax rate
T ≥ 0 on her income. In this case her budget constraint is
Bi(T ) =
©
(xi, yi) ∈ R2+ : (1− T )wi ≥ pxi + qyi
ª
. (2)
Let (xi(T ), yi(T )) be the bundle that maximizes ui(xi, yi) subject to Bi(T ), and
vi(T ) = ui (xi(T ), yi(T )) her utility after the optimal decision.
These two strategies are mutually exclusive, that is, the consumer who
chooses to pay one tax is waived from paying the other.
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Government’s tax policy is as follows, it sets a constant income tax rate,
given by T ∗ = k/W, to those consumers who choose to bear income taxation.
Whereas for those consumers who choose to bear commodity taxation the tax
rate is determined by fulfilling the budgetary equilibrium. More precisely, calling
D ⊆ I the set of consumers who choose to bear commodity taxation and I\D
(complementary of D) the set of consumers who choose to bear income taxation,
the government’s budget constraint is given by
t
X
i∈D
xi(t) + T ∗
X
i∈I\D
wi = k. (3)
The l. h. s of equation (3) represents total tax revenue. Its first part is the tax
revenue collected from commodity taxation and its second one is that collected
from income taxation. Notice that there may not exist a value of t which fulfills
equation (3) for any value of k. In economic terms this means that indirect
tax revenue is not enough to aﬀord the fiscal debt after direct tax revenue
k − T ∗
P
i∈I\D wi. To avoid this problem we assume throughout the paper
that k is small enough to be aﬀordable for each size of D. On the other hand,
given that there is a solution for equation (3), it is possible that this can be
multiple; in such a case, we assume that the government chooses the lowest
positive one. Thus, taking into account that W =
P
i∈D wi +
P
i∈I\D wi, we
can write equation (3) as
t = T ∗
P
i∈D wiP
i∈D xi(t)
. (4)
3 Game and equilibrium
Given the tax policy (T ∗, t), our game is a one-shot game Γ = {I, Si, πi}, where
I is the set of consumers, Si ={to bear income taxation, to bear commodity
taxation} is the set of strategies of each consumer, and
πi(s) =
½
vi(T ∗), if si = to bear income taxation
vi(t(s)), if si = to bear commodity taxation
is the payoﬀ function of each consumer, where
s ∈
Y
i∈I
Si = {to bear income taxation, to bear commodity taxation}n.
Therefore, in this game each consumer chooses between to bear income taxation
or to bear commodity taxation. If the consumer chooses to bear income taxation,
she has to pay a constant tax rate on her income given by T ∗ = k/W . The
payoﬀ of this action is independent of the others’ actions. On the other hand,
if she chooses to bear commodity taxation, she has to pay an excise tax t on the
price of good X. This tax t is assessed accordingly with equation (3) and, in
consequence, its value t depends on the number of consumers who are bearing it.
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Hence, the payoﬀ of this action depends on the others’ actions, that is, strategic
interdependence arises only from this tax.
It should be noted that choosing between to bear commodity taxation and
to bear income taxation, is equivalent to choosing one of the budget constraints
between (1) and (2). The following propositions lead us to the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 1
Given the tax policy (T ∗, t) and assuming that D 6= ∅, to bear
income taxation is the dominant strategy at least for the consumer
h ∈ D with the largest ratio between consumption of good X and
income.
Proof: Let h ∈ D and (xh(t), yh(t)) be her consumption bundle which, due
to the monotonicity, exhausts the bundle constraint given by (1), that is
wh = (p+ t)xh(t) + qyh(t). (5)
Let us find out the conditions for which this consumption bundle is also
aﬀordable under the income tax regime. Thus, plugging (xh(t), yh(t)) into con-
straint (2) with T = T ∗ and operating we can write
wh ≥
∙
p+ T ∗
wh
xh(t)
¸
xh(t) + qyh(t). (6)
Comparing (5) and (6) (xh(t), yh(t)) is aﬀordable under the income tax
regime if and only if
p+ t ≥ p+ T ∗ wh
xh(t)
,
taking into account (4) and clearing, this condition can be written as
xh(t)
wh
≥
P
i∈D xi(t)P
i∈D wi
, (7)
a condition which is held for at least the consumer in D with the largest ratio
between her consumption of good X and her income. In fact, if h ∈ D is the
consumer so that xh(t)wh ≥
xi(t)
wi
∀i ∈ D, we can write it as wixh(t) ≥ whxi(t) and
adding with respect to i ∈ D we have xh(t)
P
i∈D wi ≥ wh
P
i∈D xi(t), which is
just the condition (7).¥
Note that, on the one hand, proposition 1 states conditions for which the
bundle chosen under commodity taxation is also aﬀordable under income taxa-
tion. This means that the bundle chosen under income taxation is directly re-
vealed preferred to the bundle chosen under commodity taxation. On the other
hand, another drafting of proposition 1 is possible due to the fact that condition
(7) can be fulfilled by other consumers without the largest ratio consumption
of good X-income. Nevertheless, we have chosen the current draft for the sake
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of simplicity in exposition. Finally, since proposition 1 holds independently of
the cardinality of D (card(D)), we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2
To bear income taxation for every i ∈ I is the unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium for the game Γ.
Proof: Let us suppose this is not true, that is, in equilibrium there is a
number k ≥ 1 of consumers who choose to bear commodity taxation. In such
a case D 6= ∅ or card(D) = k ∈ [1, n]. Thus, according to proposition 1 this
is not an equilibrium because there is at least one individual in D who prefers
to bear income taxation. Moreover, proposition 1 applies for any size of set D,
hence, the same argument works for k − 1, k − 2, ..., 1. Finally, the weak axiom
of revealed preference ensures that when D = ∅ nobody has incentives to bear
commodity taxation because, according to proposition 1, for every consumer the
bundle chosen under income taxation is directly revealed preferred to the bundle
chosen under commodity taxation.¥
Proposition 2 is based on the fact that in our game there is always at least
one consumer whose dominant strategy is to bear income taxation. According
to proposition 1, this consumer is the one whose ratio consumption of good
X-income is larger when every consumer bear commodity taxation. But this
outcome occurs for each possible size of the set of consumers who bear com-
modity taxation. According to proposition 1, for each possible size of this set
there is always at least one consumer whose dominant strategy is to bear in-
come taxation. Thus, in equilibrium, the set of consumers who bear commodity
taxation is empty. The following Cobb-Douglas example illustrates the result.
An example
Let us consider two diﬀerent Cobb-Douglas consumers ui(xi, yi) = xαii y
1−αi
i
where α1 = 1/3, w1 = 1, α2 = 2/3, w2 = 9 and k = p = q = 1. The tax rate on
income is T ∗ = 1/10, and the commodity tax rates for the pairs (to bear com-
modity taxation, to bear commodity taxation), (to bear commodity taxation, to
bear income taxation) and (to bear income taxation, to bear commodity taxation)
are 3/16, 3/7 and 9/51 respectively. The payoﬀs matrix is
To bear commodity tax To bear income tax
To bear commodity taxation
To bear income taxation
0.4996, 4.2467 0.4698, 4.2859
0.4762, 4.2732 0.4762, 4.2859
as we see, to bear income taxation is a dominant strategy for consumer 2 but
not for consumer 1. According to proposition 1, this is because x2(tS)w2 >
x1(tS)
w1
in case in which both consumers would be bearing commodity taxation. Given
this dominant strategy for consumer 2 the best response for consumer 1 is to
bear income taxation.
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4 Pareto optimality
The previous sections have shown how n heterogeneous consumers prefer an
income tax to a commodity tax in partial equilibrium. A brief reinterpretation
of the same model allows us to illustrate a general equilibrium with production
case. In fact, let us assume that our economy is formed by the same individuals
as before but commodities are produced under constant returns to scale from
the numerarieW , which is the primary input of the economy. That is, let x and
y be the total production of commodities X and Y , Cx(x) = px and Cy(y) = qy
represent the absorption of primary input for production of each commodity
respectively. The total endowment W of primary input also has to finance the
quantity k, yielding the following feasibility condition
W ≥ k + px+ qy,
introducing a non-convexity problem in the economy. In this trend, wi is the
quantity of primary input inelastically supplied by the i-th consumer and her
income as well. Assuming that commodities X,Y are produced in competitive
industries; profits in equilibrium are zero (due to the constant returns in pro-
duction); and the aggregated supply of each good is perfectly elastic (allowing
equilibrium output to be determined by total demand), the following proposition
holds:
Proposition 3
For a constant returns economy with inelastic supply of primary
input, the Nash equilibrium of the game Γ yields a Pareto optimal
allocation.
Proof: If every consumer pays T ∗ the quantity k is financed through a non-
distorting tax instrument. Thus, the equilibrium is just a Marginal Cost Pricing
Equilibrium and, as is well-known, this is enough for Pareto optimality.¥
This result was provided by Guesnerie (1975) for more general economies
and further extended by several authors such as Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988)
or Kahn and Vohra (1987). The insight is that for non-convex technologies any
Pareto optimal allocation can be sustained as a marginal cost pricing equilibrium
by means of a lump-sum redistribution of the losses.
Note that proposition 3 depends on the assumptions made about labor and
technology. Because, as was pointed out by Little (1951) and Friedman (1953),
the consideration of leisure and decreasing returns to scale (profits), make the
labor supply elastic, allowing the income taxation to distort relative prices. In
this case it is possible to reach the opposite results even for a single-consumer
economy.
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5 Conclusion
As we have seen, a version of the preference for income taxation has been proven
for the case of several heterogeneous consumers. The proof is similar to that
used for the single consumer case: the consumption bundle chosen under the
commodity tax belongs to the feasible set defined by the income tax. The fact
that while the income tax rate is constant (the quotient between the fixed cost
and total income) and that the commodity tax rate adjusts depending on the
number of individuals who choose to pay it, means that strategic interdepen-
dence arises only from commodity taxation. In this trend, we show that an
equilibrium with consumers bearing the commodity taxation is not possible be-
cause, if this were the case, those consumers whose ratio between consumption
of the good assessed for the commodity tax relative to its income is larger would
have incentives to change to the income tax. This eﬀect prevails independently
of the size of the set of individuals who are bearing the commodity tax whenever
it is non empty. Finally, if all the individuals except one decide to pay the in-
come tax the best option left is also to pay that tax. Therefore the unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium is that in which all consumers bear income taxation.
Finally, in terms of a general equilibrium framework with constant returns in
production and inelastic supply of primary input this feature yields a Pareto
optimal allocation by means of a marginal cost pricing equilibrium.
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